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ABSTRACT 
 
When the tsunami devastated communities along two-thirds of Sri Lanka's coast 
at the end of 2004, the national community rallied impressively and, for a brief 
period, there was an opportunity to turn a fragile "ceasefire" agreement into an 
enduring peace settlement. That opportunity was wasted and underlying 
weaknesses in governance have bedevilled the recovery process. The world must 
learn from Sri Lanka's difficult experience. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After Aceh in Indonesia, Sri Lanka suffered the worst impacts of the 
December 2004 tsunami. It took almost a year to compile accurate figures 
on what was lost but the final tally made by the Sri Lankan government was 
that 35,322 people died, a further 516,150 lost their homes, 65,275 homes 
were totally destroyed and a further 38,561 were partially destroyed.1 In the 
weeks and months following the tsunami, the Sri Lankan civil society did a 
remarkable job in coming to the aid of the victims. Those who survived the 
waves, volunteers from Colombo, and international aid workers took quick 
action to collect the bodies, get everyone into temporary shelter, provide 
fresh drinking water, repair damaged roads and mangled bridges, and clear 
the debris. People went house to house in Colombo to collect donations of 
food, clothes and medicine, and television studios and the national film 
school in Colombo became the clearing houses for such donations. Privately 
owned trucks were made available and they left – loaded with donations and 
volunteers – for the south and the east. Most people assumed that the 
mangled railway line that had connected Colombo to the south would take 
years to repair yet it was made operational again within months. 
1 Figures compiled by the Sri Lankan government were made available through                 
the office of the United Nations Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, 
www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/. 
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Volunteers from around the world rushed to Sri Lanka and other 
countries impacted by the tsunami to help out. A leader of the post-tsunami 
recovery effort in the badly affected town of Hambantota, Azmi Thassim, 
later reported that such volunteers included a few teams of highly organized 
and professional people who knew exactly what to do without getting in the 
way of the locals.2 However, he stressed that many of the volunteer 
"experts", however well-meaning they may have been, expected 
overworked locals to make the necessary arrangements for them to offer 
their services and, as such, they were more trouble than they were worth. 
One writer even suggested that the airfares and per diems used to support 
young and inexperienced volunteers who could not speak local languages 
might have been better used to build temporary houses (Rajasingam-
Senanayake 2005).  
There is no doubt that the world community responded swiftly and 
generously to this unprecedented natural disaster. Many governments 
pledged large grants and concessional loans and people all over the world –
as individuals or groups – found ways to channel money or supplies to those 
affected. By the end of 2005 the Sri Lankan government had received            
$93 million in grants for tsunami reconstruction projects and other 
contributions were made through NGOs or through direct contacts (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka 2006). There was a rather unedifying spectacle of 
international NGOs competing with each other to promote their 
effectiveness as aid providers and stories abounded about some families 
getting more than they needed while others got nothing. In the Galle 
District, for example, it took nearly six months to establish effective 
coordination of the relief effort and to put in place a fair process for 
properly assessing needs.3 Increasingly, the aid "industry" operates 
according to principles of market economics and there was an extraordinary 
"branding" of donations given by governments and aid organizations, to the 
extent that some new housing developments were named by the donors. The 
chaos was made worse by the fact that Sri Lanka had no inkling of its 
vulnerability to such a destructive tsunami and there were no significant 
disaster plans in place in any of the affected areas. Azmi Thassim has 
expressed a fervent hope that other nations will learn from Sri Lanka's lack 
of preparation and from its successes and failures in dealing with such a 
                                                
2 Azmi Thassim discussed his memories of the tsunami recovery effort in Hambantota in 
an interview with Martin Mulligan conducted in Hambantota in December 2005. View 
transcript at www.communitysustainability.info/. 
3 According to the Director of the Livelihood Program of the Task Force for the 
Reconstruction of the Nation (TAFREN) in the Galle District, Dr. Nanayakara, who 
was interviewed by Martin Mulligan in January 2006. 
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widespread disaster.4 This seems a timely call in view of the gathering 
impacts of climate change. However, mistakes can easily be made even 
when the desire to help those in need is genuine. It soon became apparent, 
for example, that political interference and a lack of public sector capacity 
would reduce the effectiveness of aid channelled through the Sri Lankan 
national government. At the same time, ad hoc aid given directly to local 
communities can undermine the capacity for local governance and reduce 
the pressure for improving governance and public sector capacity at the 
national level. Furthermore, this paper will argue that decisions made in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster can have long-term implications for those 
who live in the affected communities. 
In the case of Sri Lanka, the effective delivery of post-tsunami aid has 
been made much more difficult by a worsening of the violent civil conflict 
between the national government and its armed forces, and those who have 
been campaigning for an independent Tamil homeland in the island's north 
and east for more than 20 years. At the time when the tsunami hit a rather 
fragile "ceasefire agreement" – brokered by Norway – had been in place for 
two years and efforts were being made to turn this into a more meaningful 
peace agreement. As soon as it became clear that the impact of the tsunami 
had been even more severe along the island's east coast, where local 
communities are predominantly Tamil, compared to the southern coast, 
where Sinhalese predominate, calls went out for a permanent end to the 
conflict so that the island could unite in response to the disaster. The media 
in Colombo was full of commentary to the effect that the disaster presented 
an opportunity for a permanent settlement of the conflict. Yet within weeks 
the government led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the leadership 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were sniping at each other 
over the distribution of aid and government policies regarding 
reconstruction. Despite the big effort to get emergency supplies to the 
country's east, it soon became apparent that the lion's share of the aid was 
going to the Sinhalese south. The war of words escalated into repeated 
violations of the "ceasefire" and after the LTTE called for a boycott of the 
presidential elections in November 2005, the newly elected President 
Mahinda Rajapakse called for changes to a ceasefire agreement that he 
believed was too generous to the LTTE. By the middle of 2006, the 
ceasefire agreement was in tatters and although it was not formally 
abandoned, it failed to prevent a worsening of the conflict into 2007.  
While proposals for ending the conflict have centered on the 
introduction of a federal system of government that would give a degree of 
4  As expressed in the interview with Martin Mulligan, see above. 
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autonomy to four provinces – that would include a Tamil-dominated 
province in the north-east – many writers (e.g., Wickramasinghe 2006; 
Ismail 2005; Kiribamune 2004) have argued that there has been a growing 
promotion of mythological accounts of both Sinhalese and Tamil 
nationalism that have little foundation in real history. These conflicting 
nationalisms make the construction of a multicultural society very difficult. 
Furthermore, it is not only the Tamil communities of the north and east that 
suffer from this promotion of divisive claims of identity and nationhood. 
There are signs of growing ethnic tensions within the communities of the 
south and west where Tamil and Muslim minorities continue to live in 
Sinhalese-dominated communities, and the escalation of armed conflict has 
once again drained the country's economy and undermined its tourism 
industry. Civilians living in the north and east face the constant risk of raids 
by the Sri Lankan army and airforce while those living far away in Colombo 
and the southwest once again learn to live with frequent roadblocks and the 
constant presence of heavily armed soldiers. 
The 2004 tsunami resulted in the most wide-ranging natural disaster 
the world has seen, severely affecting four different countries, and it is 
imperative that we learn as much as we can from this experience about how 
to effectively respond to natural disasters. At the same time, it has become 
difficult to separate the tsunami disaster from the human disaster of the 
prolonged and escalating civil conflict in Sri Lanka. The expatriate Sri 
Lankan writer Qadri Ismail called his recent book Abiding by Sri Lanka 
because he feels the country will not benefit from external critics – even Sri 
Lankans living abroad – who want to simplify the difficulties that the 
country is facing (Ismail 2005). The people of Sri Lanka, he suggests, need 
good friends who have a deep understanding of the country's complex 
history at the intersection of trade routes and many "external" influences. A 
deep-seated sense of being vulnerable to "outside influences" (see 
Wickramasinghe 2006) has probably been exacerbated by the shock of the 
tsunami and the country's heavy reliance on international aid. Those who 
choose to "abide by Sri Lanka" will want to ensure that the international 
goodwill that followed the disaster will not fade to white and that the 
friendship can extend to efforts to bring about a deep reconciliation of the 
entrenched conflict. At the risk of sounding like unhelpful external critics, 
we offer the following review of the response to the tsunami disaster in Sri 
Lanka in order to better understand the achievements and weaknesses in that 
response. We hope that a frank and independent assessment can help to 
strengthen Sri Lanka's capacity to deal with future disasters as much as it 
can inform the policies of those who administer international aid in 
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countries such as Australia. The review of the response was conducted in 
September 2006. 
 
 
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The tsunami affected 1,000 km stretch of land from Jaffna in the north to 
Colombo in the southwest. Although the tsunami waves impacted nearly           
65% of Sri Lanka's coastline, the local impacts varied considerably 
depending on landforms and the presence or otherwise of natural features –
such as mangrove clusters – that could mitigate the impacts. The worst 
destruction occurred in the northern and eastern provinces, which accounted 
for two-thirds of deaths and 60% of those displaced. One-third of the total 
deaths occurred in the eastern district of Ampara, where a large strip of flat 
land meets the sea. Damage in the south and southwest was generally more 
moderate, with some protection provided by headlands, dunes and steep 
coastal gradients. While there were pockets of acute damage in the southern 
districts of Galle and Hambantota, it is estimated that only 20% of the 
southern coastal population was affected, by comparison with up to 80% in 
the eastern districts of Ampara and Mullaitivu.     
Initial predictions that the tsunami would shave more than a 
percentage point from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth proved 
excessively pessimistic, and in fact GDP growth increased from 5.4% in 
2004 to 6% in 2005 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2006). The relatively 
limited economic impact is due to the fact that the sectors which 
experienced the most extensive damage – fisheries and tourism – are 
relatively minor contributors to the national economy and losses in these 
sectors were offset by a post-tsunami construction boom and strong growth 
in the manufacturing and inland plantation agriculture sectors, which were 
unaffected by the tsunami.   
While the macroeconomic impact of the tsunami is limited, the 
localized effects are severe. Catastrophic human and asset losses and 
disruption to markets and social networks have sharply reduced employment 
and output. Human suffering has been exacerbated by delays, inequities and 
inefficiencies in housing and livelihood rehabilitation processes which have 
increased poverty and threatened social stability. As is usually the case with 
disasters in developing countries, impacts fell disproportionately among the 
poorest and most vulnerable population groups – fishing communities, 
shanty dwellers and those living in the northern and eastern provinces which 
prior to the tsunami had been ravaged by two decades of civil war. 
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Table 1 
Estimated economic losses from the tsunami ($ million) 
 
Sector Asset losses 
Output 
losses 
 
Housing 340 – 65,275 houses destroyed, 38,261 
houses damaged  
Transport infrastructure  75 – 415 km of roads damaged, southern 
railway line damaged 
Water and sanitation 42 – Damage to pipelines, wells and 
coastal irrigation facilities 
Education and health 86 – 100 hospital and clinics, and 182 
schools damaged or destroyed 
Fisheries 97 200 20,000 fishing vessels damaged or 
destroyed 
Tourism 250 130 58 of the country's 242 registered 
hotels damaged or destroyed  
Others  110 –  
Total 1000 330  
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2005), Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2006) 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
 
The most obvious environmental impacts came from the massive intrusion 
of saltwater into estuaries and freshwater systems adjacent to the coast and 
problems caused by new deposits of sand. Some coastal vegetation, that 
helped reduce the impacts of the waves of houses and other infrastructure 
was damaged, although the trees generally withstood the impacts better than 
buildings and anecdotal evidence suggests that most animals got themselves 
out of harm's way (seemingly sensing the approaching waves). Sri Lankan 
government figures suggest that 23,449 acres of cultivated land was badly 
affected by the waves and saltwater intrusions, including 9,000 acres of rice 
paddy, while some 60,000 wells were also contaminated with saltwater.5 No 
figures are available on the saltwater contamination of coastal lagoons and 
wetlands but there can be no doubt that such contamination has had a bad 
impact on the coastal freshwater ecology. New sandbars cut some estuaries 
off from the sea and dredging to create new connecting channels was a 
fairly low priority for local government. Less obvious environmental 
impacts include the sucking back into the sea of considerable debris – 
                                                
5  Figures on environmental impacts are from official Sri Lankan government statistics 
made available through the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recover, 
www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/. 
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including some hazardous and toxic materials; the spread of weeds (notably 
prickly pear) in areas that were impacted by the waves; and damage to coral 
reefs from the coast of Sri Lanka out into the Indian Ocean and the 
Andaman Sea. The US-based Nature Conservancy sent a team of experts to 
Sri Lanka within weeks of the disaster and they highlighted the likely 
impact on ecosystems of debris. However, they reported that damage to 
coral reefs had been less than many feared. The picture is complicated by 
the fact that inappropriate human developments were having negative 
impacts on coastal and marine environments long before the tsunami 
arrived. This included the clearing of coastal vegetation and the removal of 
sand-dunes; a lack of meaningful control over the impact of fishing and 
harvesting on the stock of fish and other marine animals; and the mining of 
coral reefs – especially near Hikkaduwa – for lime. The problem in knowing 
the real extent of environmental damage is the lack of baseline data about 
what existed before the tsunami and a lack of capacity for monitoring any 
recovery. Environmental monitoring has never been a high priority in Sri 
Lanka and the picture regarding the environmental impacts of the tsunami 
remained murky until the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
sent in a team of 30 international experts in May 2005 to assess the 
situation. However, they also struggled with the lack of adequate baseline 
data to make any significant comparisons (UNEP 2005).  
 
 
SOCIAL IMPACTS 
 
Sri Lanka had no inkling that it was vulnerable to such a disaster coming 
from the sea – although there are references to an earlier tsunami in 
mythology dating back about 2000 years. The coastal communities could 
not have been less prepared for such a disaster; indeed a joke that quickly 
did the rounds suggested that when a minor official in the prime minister's 
department got a phone call warning that tsunami was on its way from 
Indonesia he sent a welcoming party to the airport to visit the Indonesian 
guest (whoever he might be). There were no local or regional disaster plans 
in place and, indeed, when the approaching tsunami waves sucked back the 
seawater by more than one kilometer, many people ran to the beaches to see 
what was happening! The only thing that prevented a far greater death toll 
was the fact that the tsunami struck on a Sunday, which also happened to be 
a public holiday and a Buddhist religious day. Many schools, within meters 
of the sea, were empty and significant numbers of people were visiting 
temples away from the coast. 
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The most obvious social impacts came from the loss of lives and the 
permanent injuries suffered by many survivors. Government figures suggest 
that the disaster left some 40,000 people needing long-term financial 
assistance.6 This included women who lost their husbands, children who 
lost their parents, elderly who lost younger family members, people who 
suffered severe injuries, and disabled people who lost their family support. 
The grief of the survivors was compounded by the fact that it sometimes 
took days or weeks for parents to relocate missing children and thousands of 
people were simply declared "missing" for up to a year after the disaster. 
The government followed a policy of trying to place the new orphans with 
members of their extended families but in many cases there were very few 
family members left alive. 
According to an Oxfam report, four times as many women as men 
died in the tsunami (MacDonald 2005). Along the east coast the killer waves 
hit at a time when many women were taking their daily sea bath and in 
many areas, men and boys had much more experience than women and girls 
in climbing trees. Sri Lankan men and boys are much more likely to be able 
to swim than women and girls. Of course, this meant that many surviving 
children lost their mothers and this compounds the fact that for many Sri 
Lankan households it is the women more than the men who leave to take up 
work in the Middle East and some western countries. A growing number of 
Sri Lankan children are growing up without meaningful contact with their 
mothers. 
Once the survivors got into temporary shelter, reports began to 
circulate of sexual violence committed against women and girls in the chaos 
that immediately followed the disaster (Fisher 2005). Sexual abuse and 
harassment of women appears to have continued in the emergency shelter 
camps – especially with many more male survivors than female – and 
conditions in the camps were very difficult for pregnant women and nursing 
mothers (ibid.). The surviving women were left with even greater 
responsibility to care for their own children or the children of missing 
relatives. While the men went out of the temporary camps to find what work 
they could do, the women had to make their shelters into some kind of home 
and make sure that their children were safe in an unknown environment. 
Furthermore, many of the surviving children had been traumatized by their 
experiences during the tsunami and its aftermath and the responsibility for 
looking after their emotional needs fell mainly on the women.  
                                                
6  According to Sri Lankan government figures reported by the UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/country/srilanka.asap/. 
72 
IJAPS, Vol. 3, No. 2 (November 2007) Sri Lanka's Post-Tsunami Experiences 
 
There have also been some division across Sri Lanka about how to 
best remember the dead. In the wake of the tsunami, much attention focused 
on the fact that around 1,000 people died in a train that was hit by the waves 
at a place called Peraliya, near Hikkaduwa, north of Galle and four of the 
battered carriages of that "ghost train" were left in place for a year as a kind 
of memorial. Of course, most of those who died in the train were not local to 
the area and locals began to resent the constant stream of visitors to the 
wrecked carriages. On the eve of the first anniversary of the disaster, the 
carriages were removed and President Rajapakse, who attended a ceremony 
at the site, announced that a more suitable permanent memorial would be 
built nearby. But of course the disaster was so widespread that a single 
national memorial seems quite inappropriate and as the first anniversary 
approached, many of the people in the south who had lost relatives told one 
of the authors that they were hoping for a modest local, religious ceremony 
to honour the dead in a dignified way. The anniversary led to repeat 
television showings of footage from the disaster and this only reminded the 
victims of the horrors they had experienced. Local ceremonies were, on the 
whole, subdued and low-key, as the survivors wished. However, the 
problem of how to best remember the victims of the disaster – dead and 
living – will not subside with the passing of the years. 
 
 
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
 
The reconstruction process has been impeded by deficiencies in governance 
at all levels. There have been criticisms of policy design and 
implementation processes, with a lack of clarity in objectives, and costly 
policy shifts and reversals. The subjugation of the national interest to the 
personal interests of those in power is an entrenched feature of Sri Lankan 
politics. The pervasive politicization of the bureaucracy has hampered the 
ability of government agencies to manage programs in a consistent and 
transparent manner, and corruption and political interference have 
influenced the distribution of aid resources. Within the bureaucracy 
deficiencies in technical and management capacity are exacerbated by 
poorly defined organizational structures – with a multiplicity of government 
agencies having overlapping functions – and poor coordination between 
levels of government and with the non-government sector. Political 
uncertainty, exacerbated by the civil conflict and the tendency of incoming 
governments to overturn the arrangements of their predecessors, has 
contributed to a poor investment climate which has further slowed the 
reconstruction process. In view of the longstanding tensions between the 
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Tamil north-east and the Sinhalese southwest, observers emphasised the 
importance of conflict sensitive recovery strategies which should be 
manifestly fair and equitable, decentralized (to strengthen local 
insititutions), pro-poor and consciously designed to enhance the peace 
process (Uyangoda 2005). However, a combination of political opportunism 
and bad policy resulted in the blocking of reconstruction aid to the worst-
affected northern and eastern provinces, contributing to the resumption of 
the decades-old civil conflict between the government and the LTTE. 
Reconstruction is hampered by poor inter-agency coordination and a 
heavily centralized power structure. The propensity of incoming 
governments to establish new ministries on top of existing structures has led 
to a proliferation of government agencies with overlapping policy 
responsibilities.7 In the absence of effective policy coordination 
mechanisms agencies tend to act in isolation, creating confusion and 
inhibiting the development of unified frameworks (Wanasinghe 2004). In 
the wake of the tsunami, several ministries established relief and 
reconstruction schemes with little or no consultation or coordination with 
other agencies (Institute of Policy Studies 2005). In the past, 
decentralization initiatives have met with limited success due to partisan 
rivalries and a lack of bureaucratic and political will. As a result, 
responsibilities are poorly demarcated between central and local levels of 
government, policy making remains driven from the center with little 
regional input, and local agencies charged with the delivery of public goods 
and services are underfunded and poorly equipped to perform their tasks 
(Porter 2004). The exclusion of local authorities from reconstruction 
planning has deprived policy makers of essential local knowledge and 
contributed to unsuitable or impractical policies (Uyangoda 2005; Centre for 
olicy Alternatives 2006).  
HE CIVIL CONFLICT: A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP 
                                                
P
 
 
T
 
In the days following the tsunami, there were encouraging signs of a 
rapprochement between the major Sinhalese political parties, and between 
the government and LTTE, in their response to a disaster which had 
devastated Sinhalese and Tamil communities alike. As mentioned in the 
7  In 2004, Sri Lanka had 35 ministries headed by a cabinet minister, with an additional 
21 headed by ministers of non-cabinet rank. Policy responsibilities in key sectors such 
as agriculture, industry and education are divided between several ministries (Porter 
2004: 4). 
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spapers. Not 
ng afterwards, Rajasingham-Senanayake (2005: 18) wrote:  
 
ined by power struggles among politicians, presidents 
and armed actors.  
 
able strain on the peace process (Shanmugaratnam 2005; Sirisena 
2005)
c and the LTTE leaders responded with their own 
sharpe
introduction to this paper, an initial groundswell of sentiment across Sri 
Lanka for finding a permanent solution to long-standing civil conflict over 
demands for independence for the Tamil-dominated north-east province was 
reflected in television debates and opinion pieces in the new
lo
The post-tsunami response of individuals and groups to the suffering of 
'other' communities of diverse linguisitic and religious persuasion 
demonstrated beyond doubt that the so-called ethnic conflict … was largely 
a product and susta
In the early stages of tsunami recovery the government led by 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the LTTE managed to negotiate an 
agreement on the relief effort that was called the Post-Tsunami Operation 
Mechanism Structures (P-TOMS). Yet on both sides the political leaders 
continued with divisive rhetoric and no new proposals were put on the table 
to strengthen the peace talks. Allegations quickly emerged that the 
government had favoured the Sinhalese south-western regions over the 
Tamil north-east in the distribution of aid resources and these put 
consider
.  
President Kumaratunga reached the end of her maximum term in 
2005 and the governing party – Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) – 
nominated the man who had been her prime minister, Mahinda Rajapakse, 
as its presidential candidate. The LTTE was suspicious of Rajapakse's 
attitude towards the nationalistic Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) whose 
stronghold was in the same southern region in which Rajapakse's electorate 
was located. The JVP had opposed the 2002 ceasefire agreement and 
continued to oppose the involvement of Norway in brokering peace talks. 
They had also taken action to block the implementation of P-TOMS by 
taking action in the Supreme Court and they held a balance of power in the 
national parliament (Silva 2005). The LTTE called for a boycott of the 
presidential poll. Ironically, this favored Rajapakse over the more politically 
pragmatic leader of the United National Party, Ranil Wickremasinghe. The 
JVP welcomed the election of Rajapakse and demanded a much harder line 
against the LTTE in any future peace negotiations. Rajapakse rejected JVP 
calls to sack Norway as the mediator of peace talks but he ratcheted up the 
nationalistic rhetori
ned rhetoric. 
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Soon after Rajapakse was elected, LTTE militants began a series of 
small scale violations of the ceasefire agreement, which they said were in 
response to ongoing harassment by the Sri Lankan Army based in the 
north.8 The LTTE also accused the Sri Lankan government of being behind 
the 2005 defection of former LTTE Colonel Karuna and 5,000 militants 
who remained loyal to him in the Batticaloa district. As the violence began 
to escalate, both sides threatened to withdraw from formal ceasefire talks 
and when delayed talks were held in Geneva in late February, they made 
little progress. A further round of peace talks had been scheduled for April 
2006 but the LTTE withdrew as violence escalated in the north. The biggest 
battle in the renewed conflict took place in July 2006 over a dispute about 
the provision of drinking water to a housing estate near Trincomalee. Soon 
after that 17 Tamil aid workers employed by the French agency Action 
Against Hunger were murdered in the town of Muttur and both sides in the 
conflict accused each other of being responsible. On August 10, the 
Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies told the government that renewed 
fighting was preventing them from reaching people in need. Yet the 
situation got even worse when an attack by the Sri Lankan Airforce killed 
19 Ta
g was, in turn, partly due to shortages of skilled labor and to delays 
in get
mil schoolgirls in what the military had claimed was an attack on a 
guerrilla training center. 
At the end of September 2006, the UN's Deputy Special Envoy for 
Tsunami Recovery, Eric Schwartz, visited the conflict zone and announced 
that "In parts of the north and east the tsunami recovery process has ground 
to a halt and significant investments in reconstruction, so generously 
supported by donors around the world, are now imperilled." Two days later 
a report in the Gulf Times estimated that as many as 200,000 people had 
been displaced by the renewed fighting and less than a week later the Sri 
Lankan government announced an increase of 32% in the projected military 
budget for 2006/2007. This announcement of an increase in military 
spending came just after a Sri Lankan government audit had found that only 
13% of the promised foreign aid for tsunami recovery had actually been 
used. While much of the promised aid had simply not arrived, this 
disappointing performance was also due to the renewed conflict in the north 
and east and a slow pace of reconstruction in the south. The slow pace of 
rebuildin
ting access to suitable land for permanent new settlements (Steele 
2005).  
                                                
8 The following account of renewed conflict in Sri Lanka is taken from a range of 
online newspaper and magazine reports, cross-referenced to ensure accuracy. 
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ttacking businesses owned by local Tamils. The 
rovocative action by the Tigers did not bode well for the latest attempt to 
vive the fragile peace negotiations and, predictably, the talks in Geneva 
Poor economic performances may have been largely responsible for a 
significant political shift that took place in Sri Lanka in October 2006. The 
SLFP announced that it was ending its agreement with the JVP and would 
cooperate with the opposition UNP to get ceasefire talks back on track 
(Francis 2006). Government representatives attended mediated talks with 
LTTE leaders in Geneva in late October and surprisingly put a new proposal 
for a federal structure – giving a degree of autonomy to the North-East 
province – on the table. Prior to this Rajapakse had rejected UNP calls for 
federalism, insisting that the unitary state was the only thing preventing the 
break-up of the nation. Unfortunately, the lead-up to the talks at the end of 
October was marred by a Tamil Tiger attack on a bus carrying Sri Lankan 
soldiers in the town of Habarana. The Tigers also launched a daring raid 
intended to sink a Sri Lankan navy boat in Galle Harbour. The raid was 
foiled when the three fishing vessels carrying the Tiger militants were 
destroyed before reaching their target and Sinhalese residents of Galle 
vented their anger by a
p
re
made no progress at all. 
 
 
HOUSING: THE POLICY RESPONSE 
 
The human costs of the tsunami had been tragically exacerbated by 
extensive unregulated coastal development and within days of the disaster, 
the national government announced that it would impose a buffer zone to 
prevent residential rebuilding within 100 m of the sea in the south-western 
districts and 200 m in the eastern districts. To planners in Colombo, the 
tragedy of the tsunami had one positive consequence in that it created the 
opportunity to address the chronic problem of unplanned and inappropriate 
coastal development. Unfortunately, this came as a second blow to families 
that had lost their homes and possessions in what had now become the 
buffer zone. The legislation was widely criticized nationally and 
internationally, the Asian Development Bank noting that "While there is 
wide consensus that a buffer zone may be necessary to reduce potential 
coastal risks, there is no scientific and consultative basis for the proposed 
zones" (Asian Development Bank 2005: 16). The absence of a convincing 
rationale for the buffer zone policy and lack of serious attempt to rally 
public and donor support behind it was a significant failure given its 
potentially enormous social and economic impacts, and the clumsy handling 
of policy in the immediate aftermath of the disaster seriously damaged the 
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prospects for more meaningful controls over inappropriate coastal 
development – a lost opportunity. The exemption of undamaged houses led 
to charges of inconsistency, with critics pointing out that whether public 
safety or environmental rehabilitation is the rationale for the buffer zone, it 
should be uniformly applied (Institute of Policy Studies 2005). A lack of 
consultation with local government and planning authorities was apparent in 
the creation of arbitrary setback limits without reference to local 
topography. The exemption of hotels from the ban on building in the buffer 
zone led to charges that policy making had been captured by vested interests 
and that the true purpose of the buffer zone was the relocation of poor 
fishing
tion 
Depar
lity. A lack of 
comm
 families and squatter communities to the invisible hinterland to serve 
an elite vision of coastal beautification and to make way for tourism 
development (Uyangoda 2005; Bastian 2005).   
Domestic and international criticism of the buffer zone, together with 
mounting evidence of its impracticality, led to its effective repeal at the end 
of 2005. The mandatory 100 and 200 m setbacks were abandoned in favor 
of a reversion to the provisions of the national Coastal Zone Management 
Plan (CZMP), proclaimed in 1997 but never enforced. The CZMP specifies 
area-specific setback zones ranging from 35 to 125 m depending on local 
physical conditions, and allows for exemptions to be decided by local 
government authorities in consultation with the Coastal Conserva
tment. The new regulations are generally agreed to be an 
improvement, providing the flexibility to accommodate planning 
requirements to local conditions (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2006).  
The creation of the controversial buffer zone resulted in the creation 
of two separate policy frameworks governing housing assistance – one for 
families outside the setback limit, who were allowed to rebuild in situ; and 
one for those inside it who, under the terms of the legislation, would need to 
be relocated. The former were provided with government grants to rebuild 
their houses, with some additional assistance from aid agencies, while the 
latter were to be resettled in new housing projects (NHPs) funded and 
constructed by donors, primarily international NGOs, with a smaller number 
of local institutions, individuals and commercial contractors. Donors were 
also responsible for provision of water, power and sewerage services. The 
government retained nominal responsibility for identification and 
acquisition of land, development of design regulations and approval of 
building plans, and authentication of beneficiary eligibi
unication and overlapping of responsibilities led to complex approval 
and management processes for NHPs, involving several separate 
government agencies (TAFREN 2005).   
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 sexual abuse (Weinstein 2005). Camp residents in the 
confli
here public land is very 
limite
 stays in transitional shelters and 
isgivings regarding the location of their proposed new homes, most are 
pting to rebuild. While the reversion to the CZMP setbacks reduces the 
With the concentration of human settlement within 50 m off the coast 
in most tsunami-affected areas, the creation of the buffer zone generated 
massive displacement. Around 51,000 families were relocated to inland 
transitional shelters to wait for permanent houses to be built for them within 
the NHPs. More than a year after the tsunami, many thousands were still 
there (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2005: 17). Hazardous conditions in 
these transitional camps were reported, with problems of overcrowding, 
poor sanitation and lack of drinking water and high levels of alcoholism, 
domestic violence and
ct-affected north-east faced additional hazards of harassment from 
both government security forces and the LTTE, and reports of the use of 
tsunami IDP camps as bases for LTTE military operations (Amnesty 
International 2007).   
Land scarcity has proved a significant obstacle, particularly in the 
densely populated coastal regions of the southern and western provinces. 
The government's preference has been to site NHPs on public land. 
Although the government owns more than 80% of Sri Lanka's land, most of 
it is unavailable for resettlement, being occupied by national parks and 
water catchment areas or given over to long-term agricultural leases (Centre 
for Policy Alternatives 2005). The scarcity of public land has led to the 
siting of some NHPs in hazard-prone or remote areas up to 5 km from the 
coast. Private acquisitions, the only option in areas w
d, are associated with delays and price inflation. In some regions, land 
prices outside the buffer zone escalated five – or tenfold (Institute of Policy 
Studies 2005). Long delays in the acquisition process led many NGOs to 
engage privately in negotiations with landholders.    
The government contracted with various donors for the construction 
of 34,000 housing units on more than 300 sites; however, actual 
construction lagged. By April 2006 only 6,000 houses had been completed 
and 10,000 were under construction. Delays in construction were 
particularly marked in the eastern and northern regions, where more than 
one year after the tsunami, the building of transitional shelters and 
rehabilitation of some schools and hospitals had not been completed. With 
the shifting of the buffer zone boundaries, an estimated 11,000 of the 51,000 
households in the original buffer zone are now outside it. These households 
have been given the option of resettling in the NHPs or returning to their 
land to rebuild in situ. Due to long delays in NHP construction which have 
forced many households into protracted
m
o
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NHP housing requirement, the majority will still be relocated so the 
ndamental policy remains unchanged. 
bility 
criteri
fu
 
 
 
LIVELIHOOD REBUILDING: THE POLICY RESPONSE 
 
After housing, livelihoods restoration was the second major focus of post-
tsunami aid, attracting $126 million in donor funds in 2005. At least eight 
ministries and over 100 national and international agencies were involved in 
livelihoods-related projects in 2005 (Kapadia 2005). With the massive 
destruction of assets and infrastructure, loss of human capital and collapse 
of markets, and without ready access to alternative occupations, coastal 
households faced severe economic stress in the months after the tsunami. 
During the first six months, a combination of government relief payments, 
aid and temporary cash for work programs operated by aid agencies was 
generally effective in addressing immediate welfare needs, although the 
implementation of government relief measures was partial and uneven. 
Welfare transfers to families who had lost their houses were paid for two 
months, but were then delayed for more than four months while eligi
a were changed to exclude those who maintained independent income 
sources after the tsunami. The four-month delay caused considerable 
hardship, particularly among families who had lost breadwinners and were 
unable to participate in work programs, and led to demonstrations in several 
districts. Payments to 234,000 families recommenced in June 2005.     
In tsunami-affected areas, an estimated three quarters of families 
depended on the informal sector for their livelihoods, which typically 
include a mix of fishing, tourism, roadside trading, cottage industry and 
wage labor. An estimated one-third of affected households earned their 
primary incomes from fishing or fisheries-related activities such as net-
making. Livelihood interventions have focused heavily on asset replacement 
in the fisheries sector while other occupations, particularly those in which 
women predominate, have received substantially less attention (ibid.). In 
these sectors, which are under intense pressure in the post-tsunami 
environment, well-intentioned donor interventions have in some cases 
exacerbated their problems. Post-tsunami activity in the construction sector 
has done little to support a hope for recovery in construction-related 
occupations, as the aid agencies responsible for new housing programs tend 
to employ contractors from Colombo rather than local brick-makers and 
carpenters. The female-dominated food production and garment sectors 
have had to contend with competition from a well-intentioned influx of local 
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cipients. At a time when 
depop
roblem, due to a combination of policy inertia and lack of economic and 
chnical resources. The post-tsunami environment provides a rare 
ore 
ustainable, higher-income livelihood options, an opportunity which is in 
and international aid goods. Low barriers to entry into women's occupations 
have attracted new entrants seeking to offset the loss of other income 
sources. Problems of market saturation have been compounded by poorly-
planned asset replacement initiatives which have little regard for market 
conditions or the capacity and experience of re
ulation and a precipitous decline in household incomes was exerting 
severe downward pressure on demand, more households than ever were in 
possession of sewing machines, coir-making machines and fish boxes for 
mobile trade, including many who had never previously engaged in these 
occupations (ibid.; Haug & Weerackody 2005).   
Given the difficulties of promoting alternative occupations to 
traumatized and asset-depleted populations, it is not surprising that many 
development agencies have focused on restoring traditional and well 
understood occupations. A narrow focus on restoring fisheries entails 
longer-term risks, however, with growing awareness that the sector in its 
pre-tsunami form is economically and environmentally unsustainable and 
associated with high poverty incidence. Fisheries modernization and the 
development of downstream and ancillary value-adding activities such as 
food processing and packaging and the servicing of boats and equipment, 
together with the promotion of growth sectors such as local manufacturing, 
tourism and services are important considerations in longer-term livelihood 
planning.  Although observers have for several years been keenly aware of 
the declining ability of traditional livelihood activities to provide sustainable 
rural employment, there have been few coordinated attempts to address the 
p
te
conjunction of incentive and resources for the promotion of m
s
danger of being wasted by the focus on restoring the pre-tsunami status quo.   
 
 
THE ROLE OF DONORS AND NON-GOVERNMENT ACTORS 
 
Since the tsunami the number of international NGOs working in Sri Lanka 
has increased from 50 prior to the tsunami to more than 150 (Centre for 
Policy Alternatives 2006), and government agencies have been faced with 
the challenge of managing an enormous influx of resources and NGOs with 
varying degrees of experience and resources. Due to pressures on local 
public sector capacity, governments in the affected countries have 
contracted the construction of NHPs to multilateral and bilateral donors and 
NGOs, retaining a coordination and regulatory role. Implementation is 
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complicated by limited state capacity to manage politically and technically 
complex problems of land availability, valuation, boundary establishment 
and attribution of title.  There are concerns regarding the experience and 
competence of some NGOs, with claims of competition for "clients", 
duplication of activities and poorly-designed interventions. Aid agencies 
and governments are under pressure to show immediate results, overriding 
consultative processes and contributing to hasty policy decisions. Questions 
have been raised about the motivations and activities of non-state agencies, 
with allegations that some are pursuing business interests or religious 
proselytization agendas, or acting as fronts for political parties 
(Wicramasinghe 2005). Government officials have found it difficult to 
distinguish between established professional NGOs and a plethora of newly 
constituted agencies, some of which are likely to have been formed 
opportunistically in response to the presence of aid funds (Weinstein 2005). 
The efficiency and quality of NGO programs has been compromised by lack 
of experience and pressure for quick results (Haug & Weerackody 2005: 
28). Some international NGOs simply arrived in local communities and 
started handing out cash, boats, bicycles and sewing machines on demand. 
Projects which enable the fast disbursement of large volumes of funds and 
can be attractively presented to constituencies in donor countries, such as 
the establishment of orphanages and replacement of fishing boats which 
could 
imited local knowledge rather than making use of local expertise 
yangoda 2005; Institute of Policy Studies 2005). The poaching of local 
GO staff by INGOs offering vastly higher salaries has also been a matter 
                                                
be publicly handed over to grateful recipients, were sought after by 
international NGOs at the expense of less photogenic interventions (Korf 
2006). The apparent simplicity and media-attractiveness of such programs 
attracted several agencies and individuals with little or no experience in 
fisheries (Creech 2005).   
Deficiencies have been reported in procurement and targeting 
practices, duplication of efforts, and competition between agencies for 
"clients" (Haug & Weerackody 2005). A year after the tsunami, Sri Lanka's 
Task Force for the Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) estimated that the 
influx of international aid meant that there were now more fishing boats in 
the south than there had been before the tsunami and that the danger of 
overfishing had increased.9 There have been complaints regarding the 
"crowding out" of local aid agencies by large international NGOs, and the 
propensity of foreign agencies to employ highly paid foreign consultants 
with l
(U
N
9 According to the Galle District Livelihood Co-ordinator for TAFREN, Dr. A. D. 
Nanayakarra, who was interviewed by Martin Mulligan in December 2005. 
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iticized for 
oor project management and politicization (Haug & Weerackody 2005: 
ons of frustration through demonstrations. Failures 
to take
                                                
of concern, while for their part Sri Lankan NGOs have been cr
p
28).   
 
 
COMMUNITY CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
 
The absence of formal communication and consultation mechanisms and a 
lack of strong civil society institutions to exercise countervailing pressures 
have contributed to a lack of transparency and participation, and affected 
communities have had limited input in reconstruction planning and 
implementation (Uyangoda 2005; Weinstein 2005; Weligamage et al. 2005). 
The importance of broad consultative processes is an idea that has made 
little headway in Sri Lanka's bureaucratic culture, with a commonly-held 
view among government officials that public participation in policy making 
is more an inconvenience than a useful input, causing distractions and 
delays and that the opinions of "beneficiaries" are of little value as they lack 
technical expertise. An official "top-down" approach is reported in some 
cases to extend to a failure to keep survivors informed of progress with 
resettlement plans.10 At the same time, there is widespread disquiet among 
the prospective occupants of the NHPs regarding the quality and location of 
their new homes, with many voicing concerns regarding access to their 
livelihoods and the loss of links with their traditional neighborhoods, and 
the failure to allow affected communities a say in the reconstruction process 
has led to public expressi
 specific measures to inform all members of communities about their 
programs led to the exclusion of poorer, more socially isolated families 
from aid beneficiary lists, while extended families with social and political 
resources were able to use multiple strategies for accessing aid (Haug & 
Weerackody 2005: 23).  
A lack of consultation with affected communities has been apparent 
in planning and design rules which were drawn up in Colombo with little 
regard for local family arrangements and housing practices. Concerns have 
been voiced regarding the layout and design of the new projects, which vary 
significantly in terms of attractiveness, building quality and sensitivity to 
community practices. The design specifications drawn up by TAFREN 
10 In 2004, Sri Lanka had 35 ministries headed by a cabinet minister, with an additional 
21 headed by ministers of non-cabinet rank. Policy responsibilities in key sectors such 
as agriculture, industry and education are divided between several ministries (Porter 
2004: 4). 
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include a minimum floor area of 500 square feet – a size which is arguably 
suitable for very small families, but represents a substantial reduction for 
many relocated households. Some contractors have interpreted the specified 
minimum floor area as a standard, making no allowance for variations in 
household size. With customs of extended family cohabitation in coastal 
regions, it is common for a single household to include 7–10 members, a 
pattern which is likely to have intensified with the post-tsunami integration 
of extended families. Moreover, fishing villages have traditionally consisted 
of groups of discrete hamlets or family compounds of up to ten houses each. 
Rather than incorporating a variety of dwellings suitable for various 
household sizes and configurations, some newly built NHPs consist of 
barracks-like rows of identical small buildings. The adoption of 
inappr
space and include insufficient separation between wells 
nd septic tanks. Quality concerns have been raised by the high cost of 
onstruction materials, due in part to Sri Lanka's congested and dilapidated 
labor and skills shortage, with 
ports that untrained contractors are using inappropriate materials and 
opriate layout plans is a concern, with approvals having been given 
for multi-storey high-density developments in coastal towns, a design form 
hitherto confined to major urban centers. There are concerns regarding 
design quality of some NHPs, with warnings that they may become a 
euphemism for sub-standard, low-cost housing (Philips 2005).  
A lack of local expertise among international aid agency staff coupled 
with a failure to consult with local experts has been noted (Uyangoda 2005). 
The use of Colombo-based architects to prepare site plans, with little or no 
local knowledge and limited consultation with end-users has raised concerns 
regarding inappropriate design features – for example, the design of 
inadequate ventilation systems based on an erroneous assumption that gas 
fuel will be used for cooking, despite estimates that around 75% of 
households in affected districts use cheaper biomass fuels such as wood and 
paddy husks (Institute of Policy Studies 2005). Other design problems are 
raised by lack of 
a
c
regional road network, coupled with an acute 
re
methods (ibid.).   
 
 
POLITICIZATION AND CORRUPTION 
 
The reconstruction process operates in a highly politicized context. 
Successive governments have allowed partisan political considerations to 
distort policy and administrative processes, a process which has been 
accelerated by the progressive erosion of public service neutrality since the 
1970s, when a series of constitutional amendments strengthened political 
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atronage rather than 
merit 
 the establishment of a special "Helping 
Hamb
 that one local 
politic
control of the bureaucracy by transferring control of public service 
appointments to politicians. Appointments based on p
have reduced the quality of public servants and enabled political 
interference in the allocation of public resources (Porter 2004). Hand-in-
hand with the problem of political interference is the problem of petty 
corruption, which is embedded in a wide range of official transactions 
including the delivery of welfare goods and services.   
There is abundant evidence that political considerations have affected 
the allocation of post-tsunami aid resources at all levels of government. At 
the central level, political factors are evident in significant regional 
disparities in resource allocation and the failure to implement the P-TOMS 
agreement. Almost all of the construction commenced by mid-2005 was in 
the southern districts, which account for less than a quarter of total housing 
losses, while in the severely affected eastern districts of Ampara, Batticaloa 
and Trincomalee, there has been little or no progress with reconstruction. 
Hambantota district, the constituency of former prime minister and now 
President Mahinda Rajapakse, appears to have been singled out for 
favourable attention, with
antota" office by the prime minister in addition to the standard 
district-level organizational structures set up to manage recovery 
(Weligamage et al. 2005). In Hambantota, the number of new houses under 
construction exceeds the estimated requirement by nearly 2,000 (Centre for 
Policy Alternatives 2006).  
At the local level, the use of state resources to reward political 
support has long been a feature of Sri Lankan politics, and there is 
widespread evidence of political interference in beneficiary selection and 
the distribution of aid resources. Considerable discretionary power is 
exercized by the village chief (Grama Nilidari), who is appointed by the 
local member of parliament. The Grama Nilidari is a key gatekeeper of 
access to government resources, as his approval is required for welfare 
payments, asset replacements, housing and a variety of other government 
benefits. In addition, the Grama Nilidari indirectly control access to non-
government benefits as most NGOs rely on beneficiary lists provided by 
government sources. There is widespread evidence of the misallocation of 
benefits by local officials, including the taking of bribes and political 
partisanship in the compilation of beneficiary lists. As well, politicians have 
directly engaged in the misallocation of aid resources to their own 
supporters or electorates, in some cases to non-affected inland communities. 
During the 2005 presidential election campaign, it is alleged
ian handed out some 30 fishing boats to win support for his party. 
Corruption is not restricted to the state sector, with evidence of diversion of 
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aid funds by NGO officials and by community-based organizations, with 
allegations that valuable goods such as boats are distributed to relatives and 
friends of committee members (Haug & Weerackody 2005).  
Failures of coordination and mistargeting have created serious 
inequities and inefficiencies in asset replacement in the fisheries sector. In 
one example, in a southern village in which only 23 boats had been 
damaged, seven or eight agencies were operating boat replacement 
programs, and in many districts the number of fishing craft replaced exceeds 
the estimated number destroyed by wide margins (ibid.). Stories proliferated 
of households that managed to obtain multiple boats and other equipment 
while others missed out completely. Some men who had never been to sea 
were given brand new fishing boats and some of these were then sold at 
rofit to those who could use them, while others who had lost their boats did 
ot receive replacements (Creech 2005). The use of fishermen's 
the dispensation of political 
atronage, as conduits for aid distribution has been criticized, with reports 
ffer zone (Weinstein 
2005). Directives regarding the revision of buffer zone setbacks took several 
p
n
cooperatives, traditionally an avenue for 
p
of mis-targeting and the denial of assistance to non-members (ibid.).  
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFICIENCIES 
 
Duplication and lack of coordination between government agencies created 
considerable confusion, with as many as four ministries issuing various 
buffer zone regulations during 2005. Confusion regarding the demarcation 
of responsibilities has contributed to delays. In Thiraimadu in the Batticaloa 
district, for example, an area of public land designated as an NHP site was 
found to be flood-prone and required dredging and filling prior to 
construction. Disagreement between the Ministry for Urban Development 
and the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit ensued, with each claiming 
that the other was responsible for making the land suitable for building. The 
government pledged in August 2005 to contribute half of the dredging costs, 
but by March 2006 the treasury had still not released the funds and no works 
had commenced (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2006). As a result of poor 
communication between the center and provinces, local officials are often 
unaware of policy developments, leading to the inconsistent application of 
regulations. In some areas, the buffer zone legislation was strictly enforced, 
with reports of residents being forcibly removed by police when they 
attempted to rebuild their homes and that NGOs were being instructed to 
remove emergency tents in which people were staying, while in other areas, 
local authorities were allowing rebuilding within the bu
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month
ere eligible for assistance. There have been 
report
ther equally disadvantaged groups, 
notabl
s to be issued to local authorities in Hambantota and Batticaloa 
districts, who in March 2006 were continuing to apply the original 
legislation, a factor which has contributed to the excess of NHP construction 
in Hambantota (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2006).   
Obstructive administrative practices have created obstacles in service 
delivery, exacerbating a sense of helplessness and anger among survivors. 
Many of the tsunami survivors lost all their possessions, including any 
documents that could establish their identities. Many could not access 
existing bank accounts or prove that they had indeed owned houses that 
were destroyed or damaged. A year after, the tsunami volunteer lawyers 
were still helping people to recreate necessary documentation. In some areas 
local officials insisted that only those whose names were on the electoral 
roll prior to the tsunami w
s of survivors being turned away from banks distributing relief funds 
where they have lost their identification documents or where there are minor 
mistakes in the replacement documents provided by local government 
officials (Weinstein 2005).  
The eligibility criteria for government relief schemes were often very 
broad and provided substantial discretion to local government officials, 
leading to inconsistencies in interpretation, delays and appeals. Mistargeting 
created inefficiencies in the allocation of food rations, with evidence that 
around 10% of ration cards were issued to non-affected individuals 
(Institute of Policy Studies 2005). Poor targeting has contributed to social 
tensions. Perceptions that some have unduly benefited from tsunami aid 
while the genuinely affected have not received their fair share have fuelled 
resentment (Haug & Weerackody 2005; Weligamage et al. 2005). The 
fisheries sector has been relatively well-served by livelihood programs 
while other livelihood activities have received less attention, leading to 
tensions between fishing families and others who feel that their needs have 
been neglected. Tensions also exist between the new "tsunami poor" and 
long-term poor families who were not affected by the tsunami, as many of 
the latter are excluded by post-tsunami aid programs. Families displaced by 
the civil conflict, many of whom have been living in camps for many years, 
remain ineligible for the housing and welfare benefits directed to tsunami 
survivors. The earmarking of donor funds for tsunami relief led NGOs to 
focus on tsunami work to the neglect of o
y households displaced by the civil conflict, exacerbating intra-
communal tensions. Although NGOs acknowledge this problem, most claim 
to be limited by funding arrangements which restrict their activities to 
tsunami rehabilitation (Kapadia 2005).   
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A grant of Rs.250,000 was made available for houses outside the 
buffer zone deemed to be "fully damaged", with damage amounting for 
more than 40% of total value, and Rs.100,000 for houses deemed to be 
partly damaged. The fixing of payments at arbitrary levels without reference 
to actual reconstruction costs created inequities and inefficiencies. 
Households which successfully utilized their grants were eligible for further 
low-interest loans of up to Rs.500,000, administered by the state banks, if 
they can demonstrate repayment capacity and provide collateral, thereby 
discriminating against low-income households. Women in some districts 
experi
any tsunami survivors are unable to meet. In 
ddition, loans are only given for businesses registered before the tsunami – 
ereby excluding the vast majority of microenterprises which operate in the 
d are unregistered, as well as those seeking to take up new 
velihoods in response to changed post-tsunami circumstances such as the 
enced difficulties in accessing the housing grant, which are issued in 
the name of the male household head, with reports that the banks which 
administered the payments were insisting that female property owners sign 
their land over to their husbands in order to qualify for the payment 
(ActionAid International 2006).  
The high-profile state-led Susahana credit program which was set up 
to assist microentrepreneurs to rebuild their assets and expand their 
businesses after the tsunami has had little impact in practice and by mid-
2005 fewer than 10,000 applicants had taken loans under the scheme. The 
limited outreach is due to highly restrictive loan conditions which impact 
disproportionately on poorer borrowers. In a departure from standard 
microfinance practice, loan applicants under the Susahana scheme are 
required to provide both collateral and guarantors above a certain income 
level, conditions which m
a
th
informal sector an
li
loss of an income earner. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the tsunami crisis created an opportunity for Sri Lanka to rethink 
important aspects of its physical and social development – such as the prior 
lack of strategic planning in regard to coastal development and an 
overreliance on industries that fail to provide sustainable livelihoods for the 
poor – inherent weaknesses in regard to governance and the development 
and implementation of public policy have meant that this opportunity has 
largely been lost. Even worse, the opportunity to deepen the dialogue for 
peace that grew in the aftermath of the tsunami was also frittered away by 
politicians, on both sides of the civil divide, who quickly returned to their 
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 and the Sri Lankan government was very slow in putting a 
propo
ly as 
ell. This was the first natural disaster to affect so many countries at the 
ame time and, in the context of global climate change, it may not be the 
l many lessons to be learnt about the successes as well as 
e failings and it is never too late for Sri Lanka itself to address the ongoing 
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Cent
divisive rhetoric. The results of the 2005 presidential elections deepened the 
political crisis
sal for federalism on the negotiating table. The virtual collapse of the 
fragile ceasefire that existed at the time the tsunami arrived has ensured that 
the impact of the natural disaster has been compounded by the worsening 
human disaster (i.e., the conflict), especially in the areas worst affected by 
the tsunami.  
What should never be forgotten, however, is that Sri Lankans 
responded generously to each other in the face of such a crisis and that the 
world community tried to respond quickly, effectively, and generous
w
s
last. There are stil
th
weaknesses that have seriously undermined the recovery effort to date. 
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